c Richmond Sunlight » 2007 » Electronic voting equipment; requirements and recount procedures. (SB840)

Electronic voting equipment; requirements and recount procedures. (SB840)

Introduced By

Sen. Jeannemarie Devolites Davis (R-Vienna) with support from co-patron Sen. Creigh Deeds (D-Bath)

Progress

Introduced
Passed Committee
Passed House
Passed Senate
Signed by Governor
Became Law

Description

Election procedures; voting equipment requirements; random postelection audits of equipment; and recounts. Requires localities to use optical scan tabulator systems. The bill requires the State Board of Elections to develop accommodations for disabled voters and limits the use of direct recording electronic (DRE) devices to marking ballots that can be optically scanned. The bill prohibits any form of wireless electronic communication capability on any voting or counting device. The bill requires State Board of Elections to develop procedures to enable local electoral boards to conduct postelection audits of at least two percent of machines in jurisdictions with 50,000 or more registered voters and at least five percent of machines in jurisdictions with fewer than 50,000 registered voters. The bill requires the random selection for auditing of a representative sample of vote counting machines within 48 hours of public announcement of initial vote counts and prohibits certifying results until audits are completed. The bill provides that paper records control in the event of a significant discrepancy, defined as a difference of more than one-tenth of one percent between the hand counted total and the initial machine tally. The bill requires local electoral boards to publicly announce comparative results. The bill requires recount officials as part of the recount proceedings to randomly audit three percent of voting devices using State Board of Elections standards for hand recounts. A discrepancy exceeding one-tenth of one percent requires extending the audit to all precincts. The bill deletes obsolete references to mechanical voting equipment and punchcard devices and takes effect January 1, 2009. Amends § 24.2-625.2, § 24.2-626, § 24.2-671.1, § 24.2-802, of the Code of Virginia. Read the Bill »

Status

04/10/2007: signed by governor

History

  • 01/05/2007 Prefiled and ordered printed; offered 01/10/07 075559726
  • 01/05/2007 Referred to Committee on Privileges and Elections
  • 01/24/2007 Committee substitute printed 075586726-S1
  • 01/25/2007 Constitutional reading dispensed (39-Y 0-N)
  • 01/26/2007 Read second time
  • 01/26/2007 Reading of substitute waived
  • 01/26/2007 Committee substitute agreed to 075586726-S1
  • 01/26/2007 Engrossed by Senate - committee substitute SB840S1
  • 01/29/2007 Read third time and passed Senate (36-Y 4-N)
  • 01/29/2007 Communicated to House
  • 02/04/2007 Impact statement from DPB (SB840S1)
  • 02/05/2007 Placed on Calendar
  • 02/05/2007 Read first time
  • 02/05/2007 Referred to Committee on Science and Technology
  • 02/12/2007 Referred from Science and Technology
  • 02/12/2007 Referred to Committee on Privileges and Elections
  • 02/13/2007 Assigned P & E sub: #2 (Jones, S.C.)
  • 02/16/2007 Reported from Privileges and Elections with substitute (21-Y 0-N) (see vote tally)
  • 02/16/2007 Committee substitute printed 075623726-H1
  • 02/19/2007 Read second time
  • 02/20/2007 Read third time
  • 02/20/2007 Committee substitute agreed to 075623726-H1
  • 02/20/2007 Engrossed by House - committee substitute SB840H1
  • 02/20/2007 Passed House with substitute (86-Y 12-N)
  • 02/20/2007 VOTE: PASSAGE (86-Y 12-N) (see vote tally)
  • 02/21/2007 Impact statement from DPB (SB840H1)
  • 02/22/2007 House substitute agreed to by Senate (36-Y 3-N)
  • 02/22/2007 VOTE: (36-Y 3-N) (see vote tally)
  • 03/07/2007 Enrolled
  • 03/07/2007 Bill text as passed Senate and House (SB840ER)
  • 03/07/2007 Signed by Speaker
  • 03/08/2007 Signed by President
  • 03/26/2007 Governor's recommendation received by Senate
  • 04/03/2007 Placed on Calendar
  • 04/04/2007 Reenrolled
  • 04/04/2007 Signed by President as reenrolled
  • 04/04/2007 Signed by Speaker as reenrolled
  • 04/04/2007 Enacted, Chapter (effective 7/1/07)
  • 04/04/2007 Senate concurred in Governor's recommendation (29-Y 11-N) (see vote tally)
  • 04/04/2007 House rejected Governor's recommendation (49-Y 49-N)
  • 04/04/2007 VOTE: ADOPTION (49-Y 49-N) (see vote tally)
  • 04/04/2007 Communicated to Governor
  • 04/10/2007 G Approved by Governor-Chapter 943 (effective 7/1/07)
  • 04/12/2007 G Acts of Assembly Chapter text (CHAP0943)

Comments

Charles Crist writes:

This is an unnecessary bill proposed to satisfy technology Luddites. Taxpayers have spent MILLIONS $$$ for DRI's per the Federal "Help America Vote Act" which was passed (prematurely) to statisfy those who saw conspiracies rampant in a few voting precincts. Now, as a knee jerk reaction, this Bill invokes "voting system integrity" to require a paper trail and audit actions that lead one to question the integrity of the touch screen systems, without even suggesting the cost of such "improvements" or stating how they would be paid for! I cannot believe the Senate adopted this bill without an understanding of the cost and effectiveness of their proposed "solution". Obviouslym this is a "feel good" bill to satisfy a few vocal voters who see conspiracies around every corner. Paper trails are also fraught with potential abuse....show me your paper vote and win a bottle of whiskey or some other treat of choice. I suggest that senators and delegates visit their Electoral Board and Registrar to personnaly witness the care and fail-safe methods taken in setting up and testing the DRIs before adopting unneeded and costly legislation such as this.

Jim E-H writes:

Contrary to your rant, this is not an issue for Luddites; computer professionals like myself who best understand the risks involved are the ones fighting for verified voting. No conspiracy theories are necessary; voting machines are custom programmed on a tight schedule for every election. Anyone who has worked in software knows that software produced under those conditions is of questionable reliability.

Our elections officials do their jobs very well, but setting up and testing the machines cannot verify that they are recording votes accurately. I served on the recount for the 2005 Attorney General's race, and it consisted of checking the register tapes printed by the machines and making sure the totals had been written down correctly. A "full" recount would have consisted of having the machine print out its record of individual ballots, again with no independent confirmation that its electronic records were correct.

You complain about cost, but paper ballots are routinely in use in countries far less wealthy than ours; do you really think we can't afford verifiable elections? And finally, it is telling that your only example of "potential abuse" with paper ballots is one that was solved literally decades ago; paper ballots serve as the official record, they are not given to the voter to take home.

Rick Sincere writes:

Based on my experience as an election official (I currently serve as Secretary on the Electoral Board for the City of Charlottesville), I oppose this legislation in its current form.

First, the legislation is premature. We may be facing new election law mandates through federal legislation, and we don't know what those will look like. We may end up having to rewrite the whole law again next year or in 2009.

Second, this is an unfunded mandate of at least $30 million distributed among Virginia's counties and cities. Most localities invested hundreds of thousands of dollars in new voting equipment over the past five years, equipment with a lifetime of 15-20 years. This legislation says all that new equipment must be discarded and replaced with equipment that was quite likely considered by local Electoral Boards and rejected. (That was certainly the case in Charlottesville.)

Third, this is a solution in search of a problem. In the more than two decades that electronic voting machines have been in use, there has never been a verified case of tampering. Other problems that have arisen invariably turn out to be based on human error -- the machines are not the problem.

I urge our legislators to go slow, be deliberate, and reject SB 840 and its companion bill, HB 2707. This issue can be revisited in the future, if necessary, but now is not the time to rush.